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The significance of the transformation towards ‘human capital’
Abstract
The central subject of this paper is the ‘transformation’ from ‘employee’ towards ‘human capital’, an
evolution which also reveals itself in the shift from ‘personnel management’ towards ‘human resources
management’. These issues will be considered from a political science perspective. This constibution will
focus on the power and policy dimension of these apparently quite innocent efficiency and productivity
improving operations.
What is, from a political science perspective, the significance of this shift from employees towards some
form of human incarnation of capital? What is the importance of this transition for the social balance of
power (and industrial relation system) and for the regional government policies? In sum, we want to turn
around the modern concept of ‘human capital’ with the modest intention of unraveling some less evident
dimensions of the contemporary trendy discourse on ‘human capital’. This contribution must therefore be
considered as a brief collection of considerations and reflections rather than a conscientious considered and
elaborated discourse. This brainstorm, within the political science framework of (post)fordism, only intends
to offer some arguments for discussion.2
I. Introduction.
During the past decades, several authors disentangled different forms of major
transformations. Some analists translated the social changes emanating from the great, all-
embracing structural crisis at the beginning of the seventies into a shift from ‘embedded’ (Ruggie
1983) towards ‘disembedded liberalism’, others mentioned the end of organized capitalism and the
evolution towards a ‘disorganized capitalism’ (Lash & Urry 1987). In this contribution however,
the central theme will be approached from yet another point of view, namely the transformation
from fordism towards a form of post-fordism, using a regulation approach (e.g. Boyer 1990). This
certainly does not imply an extensive or profound review of the transformation of fordism towards
post-fordism or a clarifying overview of the basics of the regulation school. The only function of
this theoretical construction is to bring the transformation that we will consider in this paper into a
broader explanatory perspective. Therefore, the concepts of (post-) fordism can only be
considered as academical arguments enabling us to approach the central issue of this paper from a
comprehensive framework.
The central subject of this paper is the ‘transformation’ from ‘employee’ towards ‘human
capital’, an evolution which also reveals itself in the shift from ‘personnel management’ towards
‘human resources management’. It must be clear that these, at first sight only or mainly economic
issues, will be considered from a political science perspective. This brings about that the power
dimension and ideological significance of these apparently quite innocent efficiency and
productivity improving operations will be illuminated. Since these developments are well
documented and intensively studied by economists, we will stay away from the management
dimension of ‘human capital’.
The purpose of this contribution lies elsewhere. What is, from a political science perspective,
the significance of this shift from employees towards some form of human incarnation of capital?
What is the importance of this transition for the social balance of power and government policies?
In sum, we want to turn around the modern, shining concept of ‘human capital’ with the modest
intention of unraveling some less airy dimensions of the contemporary trendy discourse on ‘human
capital’. It is quite evident and frustrating that, within the scope of this contribution, we can not
deal with all the interesting and relevant issues of our story and must limit ourselves to the
mentioning of some of them. This contribution must therefore be considered as a brief collection
of considerations and reflections rather than a conscientious considered and elaborated discourse.
This brainstorm, within the political science framework of (post)fordism, only intends to offer3
some arguments for discussion. First however, we will briefly consider some elements which could
clear up this trend towards ‘human capital’.
2. Some origins of the ‘humanisation’ of capital.
2.1 A small historical stroll.
It is, of course, rather obvious that we attempt to fit in the transformation under
consideration in the all-explaining, subjective and ill-defined story of globalisation, still the latest
buzzword to which observers resort in order to explain changes of all kind. After all, the
threatening strength of global capitalism, the ‘new Leviathan’ (Ross & Trachte 1990), is
disciplining state- (e.g. regions) and non-state actors (e.g. companies) all over the globe. One does
not need to expatiate frequently on globalisation, the most recent ‘great transformation’ (Polanyi
1944), in order to understand how the belief in globalisation can clarify the notion of ‘human
capital’. The road that connects them both runs from fordism to post-fordism.
The concept of fordism, which was a form of ‘monopolistic capital’ (Baran & Sweezy
1966), refers to a comprehensive accumulation regime consisting of a complex configuration of
characteristics. Fordism is, among other things, typified by a specific organisation of the
production process, an interventionist Keynesian welfare state based on an explicit or implicit class
compromise, a particular completion of the competitive struggle, an expanding market of durable
consumer goods, a tightly integrated organisation structure of the individual enterprises, etc. All
these complementary ingredients of fordism were, at least in the high days of this ideal typical
construct, mutual reinforcing, leading to the ‘golden age’ (Maddison 1991). A specific clarification
of each of these characteristics lies outside the scope of this contribution. Of particular importance
in this present paper is that fordisme is characterised by a very typical and distinctive organisation
of the production process (Braverman 1974).
The succes of fordism cannot be fully grasped without refering to the importance of
taylorism. The principles of his ‘scientific managment’ based on ‘time and motion studies’, such as
the rigorous separation of executive and conceptual tasks and the attempt to determine the one
best way to carry out specific tasks, are universally known and need no further elaboration.
Essential in this contribution is the reason behind the introduction of taylorist principles of the
division of labour.
Before fordism, a technological paragidm that rests on the deployment of unskilled labour
used in conjunction with specialised single-purpose machinery, the dominant ‘industrial’4
production was highly manual and was carried out by skilled, all-round, artisanal workers whose
power position was based on a ‘knowledge monopoly’. This means that the owner-entrepreneur
was dependent upon his workers for the technological organisation, tempo and execution of the
production process: only these skilled workers, a group shielded by monopoly mechanisms, knew
how the production had to be carried out. These core workers were essential for the enterprise.
Their craftsmanship and competence was decisive for the succes of the enterprise in the
competition struggle.
The ‘knowledge monopoly’ and the power position based on it of these core workers
became endangered by the introduction of capital goods, such as machines, and by the extension
of the population dependent on the sale of their (low skilled) labour in order to survive, a by-
product of industrialisation and urbanisation. Taylorism was designed with the intention of
breaking through the resistance of this limited group of highly skilled workers against these
evolutions (such as mechanisation and the expansion of cheap mass labour) which undermined
their power position and thus their working conditions and wages. In this respect, taylorism was
successfull.
The fanatical subdivision of labour tasks, the reduction of the autonomy of workers, the
introduction of a series of control and supervision mechanisms, the use of an intermediate layer of
controllers and supervisors and other principles of taylorist organisation, gave rise to the
intensification of the production process and the de-skilling of labour. Traditional high skilled
craftsmanship decreased considerably and was increasingly replaced by simple, standardised,
repetitive, low skilled mass labour which did not require much education nor experience. Labour
became just another production factor. One could allege that, in a way, the relative importance of
an individual production factor for the success of the enterprise switched towards capital, away
from labour.
 Fordism, however, was much more than the simple application of taylorism and the
widespread introduction of the assembly line. After all, pure taylorism was blind to many things,
e.g. the importance of mass consumption. Low wages, an intens competition between workers and
a deflation policy stood, amongst other factors, in the way of a necessary and sufficient
consumption demand. In fordism, these considerations became central. The attention, in fordism,
for the importance of mass consumption is symbolised by the introduction of the ‘5$ day’: for the
first time in history, the mass worker became a mass consumer. The considerable productivity
profits were, in accordance with a social class compromis, distributed over consumption ((in)direct
wages) and investment. This fordist ‘virtuous cirlce’, supported by a Keynesian welfare state, led
to the ‘golden age’ of postwar capitalism.5
However, in the light of the subject of this paper we cannot elaborate further on these
matters and must focus our attention on reflections concerning the organisation of the labour
process, the significance of the individual employee in that process and the new power resources
within the collective industrial relations framework.
2.2  The fordist way.
In fordism, where the industrial sectors were the dominant sectors of the economy, the bulk
of labour was carried out by a mass of low skilled, low educated workers who, brought together in
an impressive workshop, were engaged in repetitive, simple, standardised labour, denied of much
responsibility and strictly defined by a clear and narrow job description. Fordist workers had to
carry out their simple duty, at a (high) tempo enforced by machines,  without them being required
to engage in creative, problem solving thinking. Considering their low skill level, workers dit not
require much education nor vocational or professional on the spot training: they stood clearly on
the ‘doing’ side of the ‘thinking-doing’ dualism. Therefore, it was not very surprising that fordist
management faced major motivation problems. The only way that cooperation and compliance
could be induced was through higher direct and indirect wages and through other social
concessions. In short, bosses tell workers what to do, when to do it, how to do it and how much
to do it …
The majority of individual employees had to work with highly specialised and very inflexible
machines. The lifespan of these expensive machines was dependent on the lifespan of the products
made by these machines. Maintenance, adjustment, planning or improvement of these machines
were responsibilities reserved for a specialised team.
These qualifications, on the other hand, created the objective conditions for a new power
base of labour. The homogenisation, leveling and concentration of labour and the equality of
working and wage conditions encouraged the mutual solidarity between workers and the similarity
of interests. The parallel definition of their life and work situation and the accordance of interests
stimulated the extension of mass integrative encompassing industrial unions. These unions derived
their power resources no longer from the knowledge monopoly of their members but from their
numerical strength. This strengthened power base of mass union organisations led to an increase of
the social expenditures of the welfare state, an evolution based on a class compromise and enabled
by the economic prosperity of fordism. However, these sociale expenditures were at the same time
the consequence of and a precondition for the success of fordism.6
The story about the decline of fordism is long and complicated and has been written many
times now. A new international division of labour, the end of Bretton Woods, the difficulties with
the financial and political tenability of the welfare state, inflation, the saturation of the market of
consumer durables, increasing labour protest against the work pressure and alienation effects of
the labour process, decrease of the productivity rate, etc. It is impossible here, nor necessary, to
tell this whole story. In the light of the subject of this paper, we will focus on the shortcomings of
fordism resulting from the specific organisation of the production process and its use of labour
force in order to illuminate the evolution towards a concept of ‘human capital’.
3. The shift towards ‘human capital’: some elements of an explanation.
3.1 Push-factors.
Several authors point towards the rigidity of the production process and of the labour
regulation as one of the main causes of the bankruptcy of the ‘fordist way’. The change of
consumer preferences (D’Aveni 1997) towards less standardised, more customized and qualitative
products, the saturation of and increasing (foreign) competition on the market of consumer
durables necessitated a profound changeover of the production process. In order to remain
competitive, enterprises needed to respond as fast as possible to the alterations of the market
conditions and consumer preferences and to the growing and intensifying competition.
However, in fordism, increasingly expensive man and his fine-tuned specific-use machine
were specialised in the production of one, and mostly just one, specific good. It took a lot of time
and money for these machines to be adjusted so that they could switch towards the production of
another kind of product or towards another variety of the same product. “Technological
developments during the 1950s and 1960s came in the form of further increases in the degree and
scope of mechanisation and the introduction of automated technologies. A number of case studies
have revealed the enhanced control over the labor process that capital is able to achieve as a result
of automation. These however, have tended to concentrate on the deskilling of highly skilled
workers, who possess significant power in the shop by virtue of their craft skills.” (Fairris
1994:198) A close reading of the most cited studies on automation’s impact on the workplaces in
the 1950s suggests that automation was likely to decrease the amount of team production and to
reduce the ease of communication between workers. Fordist automation seemed to increase the
distance between work stations, diminish workers’ control over the pace of production, increase7
the intensity of supervisioin and decrease the differentiation of tasks. Knowledge was concentrated
and centralised by the management.
The individual low killed worker, operating his machine, was unable and not authorized to
redesign or improve the capital goods so that these could be adjusted quickly in order to meet the
new consumer preferences and beat the competition. Furthermore, the tightness of the labour
market had temporarily altered the power balance in favour of labour: in the beginning, most
countries were typified by “a balance of power relatively favourable to capital, assisted by political
setbacks of radical sections of the labour movement which helped to restrict the demands of
organized labour to the incomes sphere. Basic innovations and further development of Taylorist
and Fordist labour organisation methods thus became possible, resulting in a sharp rise in
productivity. (...) In a second stage which can be described as the full-blown Fordist stage, the
unions were succesful in achieving real rises in wages in line with the increase in productivity
which should certainly be seen in relation to the positive influence on their bargaining power of the
reduction in the reserve of unemployed labour driving from the high level of growth.” (Frantzen
1990:5). This was translated into an increase of the labour costs and social expenditures at a time
when the productivity got into trouble and markets shrunk. The impotence of the cumbersome,
bureaucratic, hierarchical structured (top-down) fordist enterprises to react quickly and flexible led
to unmistakable difficulties. Drastic measures seemed inevitable. So, the unravelling of the Fordist
system entailed the beginning of major changes in capital-labour relations. Central to this
unravelling was a drop in the rate of growth of productivity across the OECD quite generally. The
productivity slowdown in turn put pressure on other aspects of capital-labour relations, such as
wage formation, the degree of centralization, and the extent of welfare state spending. Not only
the organisation of the production process went through severe changes, even the organisation
structure of fordist enterprises had to be redesigned. Hence the popularity of downsizing,
outsourcing, deconcentration, decentralisation, the construction of horizontal network structures,
etc.
“In Europe and the United States, the belief that market ‘rigidities’ (especially in labour)
were the cause of the decline in productivity growth and profitability became widespread.” (Schor
& You 1995:7) In other words, those very same arrangements which had secured the stability that
made renewed capital accumulation possible in the post war period had now grown sclerotic and
became an impediment for continued economic growth.
The measures proclaimed by the new conventional wisdom come down to the flexibilisation
of the production process, the outsourcement of activities and the downsizing of the enterprise.
They also explain the switch towards ‘lean production’ systems (Womack, Jones & Roos 1990)8
and the revaluation of the importance of labour. Over the course of the twentieth century, the
organisation of production has evolved from craft to mass to lean and flexible production (e.g.
flexible manufacturing systems (FMS), using CAD (computer aided design) and CIM (computer
integrated manufacturing)) in the final decades of this century. The latter has tended to rely less on
vertical integration and more on horizontal linkages between firms, often of different national
origin. (McClintock 1996)
However, the novelty of the contemporary best practice of lean production must not be
exaggerated, it does not indicate the definitive end of the mass production processes. Moody
points out that lean production produces “high volume output through the standardisation of
products and process beyond Henry Ford’s wildest dreams. It attempts to capitalize on economies
of scale (output per unit of capital) as much as on the more fashionable economies of scope
(ability to produce different products with the same unit of capital) associated with flexibilization.
Real flexibility in lean production lies primarly in the combination of information-age technology
and worker experience with archaic forms of work organization, such as contracting-out,
casualization, old-fashioned speed-up, and the lengthening of working time.” (Moody 1997:86) In
other words, these evolutions bring about a certain degree of polarisation of the work force, with
relatively well-paid skilled and professional core-workers on the one hand and less skilled, less
educated, less paid workers which are often employed on a part-time or temporary basis on the
other hand. (Brand 1997: 59)
There is, however, more to production than its leanness. The production process should also
take place in a ‘high commitment organization’, where ‘cross-functional teams’ work on the re-
engineering of the ‘high performance work systems’. After all, since firms can no longer
exclusively focus on product innovations and must consider all aspects of process innovations, it
becomes quite fundamental for a company and its success in the global competition that they bring
in all the experience, know-how, skills, expertise or knowledge of their workers wich are involved
daily in the production process and which are therefore the exquisite partners if it comes to advice
and recommendation concerning process adjustments or a redesign of the organisation structures.
As the lessons of the fordist defects made so clearly, these human assets are fundamental. In
a speedy economy based on a complex customized quality production system using information
technology, cross-border competition, fast changing preferences and market conditions, one
cannot do without a core of flexible, skilled workers capable of adapting the ever flexible capital
goods, of suggesting ideas, etc. The necessity of the revaluation of the worker and his place in the
production system is even more inevitable when one considers some pull factors: human capital9
becomes one of the main competitive advantages of the European Rhineland economies in the
light of the international division of labour.
3.2 Pull-factors.
The idea of globalisation, and its ideological dimension, is another important element in the
explanation of the shift of the balance of power between labour and capital and towards the
revaluation of the individual worker. According to Palan, Abbott and Deans, globalisation
represents “an attempted resolution of the fordist contradictions. (…) We regard globalization not
as a quantitive change denoting the global integration of markets, but as a qualitative change
which implies an intensification and extension of capitalist relationships.” (Palan, Abbott & Deans
1996:19) This qualitative change had severe consequences for the bargaining position of labour.
The fact that, in conformance with the globalisation thesis, workers can be more easily substituted
for each other across national boundaries undermines the post-war social bargain between workers
and employers. The bargaining power of labour erodes (Rodrik 1997:4-5) because “in the new era
of global capitalism, employers can counter labor’s former strategic strength by the threat and
reality of capital mobility towards more compliant labor and more propitious political or
technological environments. (…) What is qualitatively new to world capitalism, however, is that
investors may find a broadening geographic field of choice in which modern methods of
production and adequate human and physical infrastructure is available without the impediments of
unwanted constraints. It is the scope and size of the new field of investment opportunity which has
changed the strategic balance of social power in the older industrial regions.” (Ross & Trachte
1990:6, 8).
After all, the source of investor’s power lies in their ability to withhold investments, either by
not investing at all or by not investing in a particular jurisdiction: “as long as different jurisdictions
are competing to land new economic activities, or keep existing ones, companies have the
potential to improve their outcomes in these bargaining games by using auctions among
governments.” (Thomas 1997: 20) In this view, the power of management is based on the ability
to choose the site for their economic activity out of an enlarging list of possibilities. Along with
other aspects such as the structural and thus persistent unemployment, the waning impact of
industrial sectors and an ideological paradigmatic shift, this power generating aspect of potential
and actual capital mobility leads to a weakened resistance of labour against labour market reforms.
These reforms concern the government policies and the individual enterprise.10
Besides the weakening of the bargaining position of labour, globalisation has yet another
part to play in the story of the intensified importance of ‘human capital’. This has to do with the
well known thesis of the new international division of labour, studied by several academical
disciplines since many years now (e.g. Fröbel, Heinrichs & Kreye 1981). According to this
international division of labour, labour-intensive low-skilled mass production jobs are increasingly
shifted towards (semi-)peripheral new industrialising countries while the older core industrial
countries must focus on knowledge and technology-intensive, high-skilled production, at least if
the last mentioned want to maintain or improve their level of prosperity. It must be clear that this
is not a matter of an absolute fact but rather of a relative evolution: not all low skill, labour
intensive production is concentrated in the periphery and knowledge-intensive high skilled jobs are
certainly not a monopoly of the core. Elsewhere (Devos 1999) we have put this cutthroat
competition-dimension of globalisation in perspective and came to the conclusion that, although
the fact that as an empirical, actual process it most certainly can not be denied, globalisation is
subjected to a serious amount of mythologisation and that this myth is often used as an argument
to enforce some - indeed sensible - policies, such as labour market reforms. (Veseth 1998)
Although some perceptions of globalisation rest on an exaggeration of the real dimension of
globalisation, one can not deny that globalisation has increased the cross-border competition,
especially what concerns the labour intensive low skilled production. Therefore, the European
countries must invest in and focus on their most unique selling proposition, people, at the same
time the most immobile production factor. Since capital (goods) and technology are considered to
be more or less mobile on a global scale, it becomes essential for regions to invest in what is bound
to that region in order to attract new and maintain existing investments.
4. The leading part of human capital.
It must be clear that it is a meaningful conclusion that “the driving force in the economy has
become knowledge, creation, handling and application.” (Kenney 1997: 89-90) Even for small
enterprises, a high stock of knowledge portends a tremendous wealth-creating potential: “In
creating wealth, knowledge is increasingly taking a front seat to the traditional factors, that is
physical and fiscal assets.” (Kim & Mauborgne 1999:44) A good deal of analysts indicated that we
are now facing the transition from a production to a knowledge economy, in short “we are in a
‘new economy’.” (Triplett 1999:13) In other words, the old foundations fo success are gone: “For
all of human history the source of success has been controlling natural resources – land, gold, oil.
Suddenly the answer is ‘knowledge’.” (Thurow 1999:57)11
Both Blair’s Fabian Pamphlet (1998) and Giddens’ recent book on the Third Way (1998),
intellectual bibles of the so-called ideology of the Third Way, start from the clear assumption and
assertion that capitalism has undergone an irreversible epochal change (Froud, Haslam, Johal,
Leaver, Williams & Williams 1999). Blair indicates that globalisation and technological change
have made skills the main drivers of employment (Blair 1998:6) while for Giddens the epochal
change comes down to the end of mass production (Giddens 1998:16). In other words, these two
essential pillars of the intellectual foundation of the currently so popular conventional wisdom
refer to a fundamental shift of the economy in general and of the production system in particular.
In this sense it becomes clear that the Third Way as a package of policy proposals seems to be
written just for the purpose of a revaluation of the human capital factor: “Government has an
essential role to play in investing in the human resources and infrastructure needed to develop an
entrepreneurial culture. (…) Education and training have become the new mantra for social
democratic politicans. (…) Welfare expenditure should remain at European rather than US levels,
but be switched as far as possible towards human capital investments.”  (Giddens 1998: 99, 109,
122)
In conformance with these proposals, the traditional system of strongly segmented jobs and
rigid job descriptions must be abandoned in order to meet the quickly changing differentiated
consumer preferences. In order to meet such demands effectively, “a production line should be
able to produce a wide range of products, and workers need multi-functional skills and greater
adaptability. Jobs are more complex, involving more tasks, multiple skills and greater interaction
among workers, between workers and employers, and with suppliers and customers. With the
quality of products increasingly representing a core determinant, the task of quality inspection
must be incorporated into the production line, involving the need to broaden job definitions.” (ILO
1997:94) New (information) technology becomes the key to a more flexible form of production
which is more responsive to increasingly rapid changes in the market. According to Brewster,
Mayne & Tregakis (1997:134), “such developments may depend for their succes upon a more
skilled, motivated and flexible workforce.” As a consequence, the array of employment contracts
needs to be broadened, and indeed it did. It should be clear that evidence of research is
incontrovertible and unanimous: there has been a substantial change in Europe’s labour markets
since employers now have open to them, and are using more extensively, a wider range of means
of getting the work done. The range, extent and use of nearly all forms of flexible working hours
and contractual arrangements is increasing.12
In reducing the autonomy of national macroeconomic policy, globalisation enhances the
firm’s role as the primary engine of wealth and job creation while at the same time it exposes the
firm to heightened competition and erodes the shelter in which firms used to operate. Globalisation
makes flexibility at the enterprise level essential for responding to rapid product market changes.
Robert Cox (1987) has indicated that the large-scale organisation of flexible quality production
requires the general use of general use machines and other capital goods which can easily be
converted by skilled trained workers to which more is entrusted than mere execution. This new
division of labour on the enterprise level, a reversal of tayloristic organisation principles, needs a
‘high trust’ environment in which management leans on the initiatives, knowledge and experience
of its core workers. The latter become so important that their revaluation appears out of a new
indication, ‘human capital’. There is no longer managment of the personnel, but of the ‘human
resources’. Labour, incarnating valuable knowledge and knowhow, becomes the most important
asset of the enterprise, since other productions factors are more easily available on the global
market.
In the light of ‘diversified quality production’ (Streeck 1992) and the importance of
competitiveness on a global scale, an intense cooperation between the management on the one
hand and core workers on the other hand is essential. After all, the present-day post-fordist
production system must offer a third way between the low volume (craft) production of non-
standardised customized quality competitive products and the high volume (fordist) production of
price competitive products: a flexible and high volume customized production of price and quality
competitive products. These requirements have far-reaching consequences for the position and
role of ‘labour’ in the production process and in the enterprise in general. As we indicated, the use
of term ‘human capital’ is emblematic of this evolution.
As Womack, Jones & Roos (1990:13) noticed, lean production uses less of everything
compared with mass production. So lean and flexible production comes down to “the continuous
search for marginal improvements in costs by constantly stressing and readjusting the production
system and, above all, the labor process. Lean production is run by a system of ‘management-by-
stress’ (...). Kaizen, just-in-time, multiskilling, job rotation, teams, quality management, numerical
and functional flexibility, extensive outsourcing, and all the well-known features of lean production
are the means to reduce the resources, including labor, needed to produce a given product or
service. This is done by a constant process of stretching one phase of production to the ‘breaking
point’ by reducing the number of workers and/of mass of materials available, and then recalibrating
the other phases of the production process. Efficiency and improvements are defined as cost
reduction (...), in practice cost reduction most frequently applies to labor. In particular, getting13
lean means eliminating as much non-value added labor time as possible.” (Moody 1997:87) This
makes that whatever remains is of greater importance, that the remaining core valued labour is the
essential ‘human capital’ of the enterprise.
We refered several times to polyvalent ‘core workers’. This indicates that there are non-core
workers. We will not go into the economic logic of this evolution. Anyhow, there can be no
mistake about the fact there is still a large group of low skilled workers employed in monotonous,
repetitive, low knowledge, mere execution jobs, even in the European Rhineland countries.
Despite the fact that, in many cases, these workers too are being approached from a ‘human
capital’ point of view, they remain the subject of more classical control and supervision
mechanisms and are not involved in the same way as the core-workers are. We will turn to this
point in section 5.1.
5. Significance out of a political science perspective.
5.1 The capital-labour balance of power.
The birth of a new post-fordist, sometimes called toyotist or sonyist, flexible regime of
accumulation gave way to a range of appreciations. (Harvey 1989) Some indicated that the new
technologies and organisation shemes opened up the possibilities for a reconstitution of labour
relations and of production systems on an entirely different social, economic and geographical
basis. New forms of worker-co-operative organisations, armed with decentralised technologies of
command and control, should enable workers to evolve as individuals in an evironment of relative
freedom, creativity, trust, shared (financial) interests, greater responsibilities and commitment. An
environment in which management is more dependent on the cooperation with human capital, in
which employees become co-workers. In this partnership between management and human capital,
interests are no longer antagonistic. The class struggle becomes an outdated concept of ancient
times. This implies that unions should alter their strategies, purposes and favourite negotiation
level. The centre of gravity should be based on the enterprise level, their strategies should be more
cooperative and purposes more modest. Company-based unions too have to take, through their
influence on the human capital, responsibility for the success of their enterprise in the global
cutthroat competition and they too must contribute to the management of flexibility, in association
and through an open dialogue with the management of the firm. This implies a more cooperative14
unionism which is mainly concentrated on the long-run profitability of the individual firm, a close
community of harmonised interests.
Others maintain that the ideas of flexibilty, outsourcing, etc. are extremely powerful terms
legitimizing an array of political practices which are chiefly reactionary and anti-worker and create
a climate of opinion, an ideological condition, that renders working-class movements less
powerful. These authors emphasize the casualization of labour, and claim that essentially, when
one looks behind the smoke screen of this trendy rhetoric of cooperation and commitment, behind
the ‘fuss’ about the revaluation of labour, the position of workers has not improved so
dramatically as some want us to believe, on the contrary. They point out that uncertainty about
demand and the cutthroat competition has led to uncertainty about labour requirements, and that
employers have sought many different ways to make labour both cheaper, more easily variable in
quantity and more tame and cooperative. From now on, we will focus on the analysis of this
second group of authors since they most explicitly deal with the power-dimension of the post-
fordist approach of labour.
These authors insist that we must see through the optimistic ideological varnish in order to
determine what is really going on. They underline that flexibilisation of labour involves a transfer
of risks from the employer towards the employee, an evolution that goes against the central
concern of the interventionist Keynesian welfare state. Several analysts of post-fordism payed
especially attention to the polarisation between different categories of workers. According to
Jessop, there will be no such thing as a generalisation of “core workers’ rising incomes to other
workers and/or the economically inactive. Indeed, as post-fordist accumulation will be more
oriented to worldwide demand, global competition could further limit the scope for general
prosperity and encourage market-led polarisation of incomes.” (Jessop 1994:20) Pierson on his
turn observed a process of de-massification of labour: “The demands of batch production and
‘niche marketing’ taken together with the production possibilities afforded by the application of
new technologies favour a ‘de-massification’ of the workforce. At its simplest, employment is
polarised between a ‘core’ of well-paid, secure and qualified wage-earners with polyvalent skills
and a ‘periphery’ of poorly paid, casualised and unskilled workers. There is a growth in sub-
contracting, in ‘atypical’ work practices and in employment within the (largely unregulated)
informal economy.” (Pierson 1994: 100-101)
Frantzen refers to the effects of new technologies and remarks that these will “be more likely
to add momentum to the separation of work that requires the application of intelligence and work
that is purely mechanical, and the average operator would be reduced to perform the task of filling15
the gaps in the computerized production process.” (Frantzen 1990: 183) So, the post-fordist
production process and the emphasis on information technology could lead to, on the one hand,
the development of a core of skilled workers that firms will seek to keep, in view of their high
training costs. Because of their skills, such workers will tend to possess enough bargaining power
to influence real wage levels. On the other hand, this will be balanced by a situation where the
majority is composed of less skilled workers who are easily replaceable, hired with less job
security, where possible without trade union protection, and payed off against each other in order
to force wages down. This gives rise to dualisation and the construction of a two-tier society.
The practice of outsourcement is not unfavourable to the above mentioned evolution.
Outsourcement is mostly driven by the popular recommendation to specialise in core activities in
which one can gain a competitive advantage and to toss down all others. In many cases, this will
mean the displacement of more traditional contracts of employment with individuals by contracts
for services with other organisations. The employment relationship will be superseded by a
commercial relationship and the organisation which is giving out the contract will have no further
concern with employment issues since these will be passed on to the subcontractor. This brings
about that the (relatively stronger) union organisation of the firm which is contracting out will
have less or no influence on the employment conditions of the workers who are now carrying out
what was formerly done within the firm. As The Economist indicated, this process could lead to a
“widespread re-examination of the idea of contracts between companies and employees.” (The
Economist 21 dec. 1996:114)
Another important evolution that is indirectly connected with the increased importance of
human capital and which must be taken in consideration is the decentralisation of collective
bargaining, an evolution which, according to the ILO, has to do with globalisation: “Capital’s
potential mobility may exceed its actual mobility, but the effects are the same. Firms are less able
and less willing to sustain their share of financing the welfare state than when capital was more
immobile and economies less open. This applies not only to who pays the non-wage cost bill, but
also to the full scope of collective bargaining.” (ILO 1997:74)
The fordist strongly institutionalised forms of collective bargaining and centralised
negotiations over constantly rising nominal wages are increasingly undermined in favour of the
promotion of flexible, decentralised and differentiated agreements on wages, safety and labour
time, specifically on the firm level. The level of the individual enterprise is an increasingly
important negiotiation level in the collective bargaining sytem. According to some authors of post-
fordism, this leads to a kind of ‘new unionism’, e.g. the substantial growth of pro-management16
company based unions, which replaces the ‘militant’ appearance of the fordist unions. In contrast,
post-fordist unions are seen as stripped of their power to participate in neo-corporatist regulations
and to oppose management succesfully. According to these authors, new unionism plays the role
of a decentralised factor of moderation and discipline without the power of opposition. However,
“for centralized, encompassing trade unions, disintegration of the neo-corporatist machinery of
joint regulation would destroy their strategic capacity for solidaristic interest representation aimed
at protecting, as much as possible, the status of individual workers from the whims and
uncertainties of the market. For employers’ associations, given the decline of union bargaining
power in the crisis, the same development would mean the realization of an important interest of
their members - the interest in flexibility, ‘de-bureaucratization’, higher autonomy in dealing with
the uncertainties of more competitive and volatile markets, etc. Employers therefore have an
alternative, and in principle a preferred alternative, to re-negotiating existing agreements - which is
to let the machinery of central negotiations fall into disuse and return the regulation of the
employment relationship to the market. This places them at a strategic advantage over their trade-
union adversaries for which the market becomes less rather than more acceptable as a regulator of
working conditions when the economy declines.” (Streeck 1984:294) So, there is no question of a
formal withdrawal from capital, but rather of a subtle re-setting, in line with the changed balance
of power, of the institutional balance between the different levels of bargained interest
accomodation. All that is needed for this to happen are constant pressures, inside and outside the
various bargaining arenas, for special regulations and exemptions for individual firms and
industries and for a general delegation of bargaining issues down to the level of the individual firm.
This must enable the individual firms to adjust the collectively bargained agreements to the
concrete difficulties, challenges, possibilities, market conditions, etc. of that firm. Indeed, as
research of the ILO (1997) made clear, enterprise-level industrial relations have acquired unusal
prominence relative to other levels of the industrial relations system.
All these evolutions mentioned above, such as flexibilisation, outsourcement,
decentralisation, which have to do in some way or another with the general recommendations
concerning the reassessment of some core parts of the labour force, have clear consequences for
the social balance of power. These evolutions encourage the existing processes of class
dealignment, of class decomposition, of de-massification, of individualisation. The broadening of
labour contracts and arrangements, in the light of the flexibilisation of labour and the revaluation
of human capital, leads to an increasing fragmentation of the working class. In contrast to fordism,
where the equality or similarity of wages, contracts and working conditions gave way to a clear17
and general class solidarity (of which powerful encompassing industrial trade unions were the
expression), the increasing diversity and individualisation of wage systems, contracts, working
conditions, responsibilities, etc. weakened this class solidarity which is so essential for the
collective protection of working class interests. After all, labour only has power when it operates
collectively, in contrast to capital where individual units (the individual firm) are powerful. The
new ‘human capital’ approach of employees promotes the segmentation of the working class. The
increased diversity of statutes, employment contracts, work forms, etc. complicates the formation
of collective interests, of a common strategy, of mutual understanding and the collective definition
of purposes.
Human resources management or other modern versions of personnel management, aiming
at the maximal effectuation of the potential of the human capital (e.g. by means of life long
learning, reskilling programs or the individualisation of wage systems), contain the construction of
new communication channels, besides and around the classic patterns of communication between
trade unions, as the collective representatives of labour, and the management. These new open
communication channels, preferably embedded in a high trust environment, lead to more direct
communication with the individual employee. They, amongst other things, intend to increase the
commitment of the work force. An important aspect in which this pursuit shows intself is the
increasing popularity of individual and personal remuneration systems and financial participation
formulas, which have in mind to enlarge the commitment and involvement of the human capital.
According to the ILO, an important consequence of these ambitions to increase the commitment
of the human capital is that they call into question the role and position of trade unions since they
“might distance the workers from the trade unions and erode the traditional forms of participation,
collective bargaining and consultation with workers’ organizations or representative bodies. It is
not surprising that union leaders have at times opposed such policies. (…) Human resources
management policies may undermine existing industrial relations where labour-management
relations are prone to conflict. In this case, they might be used as a corporate strategy of union
avoidance and combined with enterprise paternalism.” (ILO 1997:97)
In this respect it is also essential to remember that when workers are tied “to their present
place of employment, then this should have a profound impact on both their definition of interests
and, accordingly, the policy options open to their trade unions. (…) The willingness of workers to
inflict damage on their employer in the support of class-wide, solidaristic interests is inversely
related to the degree to which their own economic fate has become, as a result of a decline of the
external labour market, inseparable from that of their employer.” (Streeck 1984:304, 305)18
As the ILO indicated, these new management approaches “enhance the scope of
management control through the leverage of personnel assessment and foster individualism. As a
consequence, they call into question, at least in part, the traditional industrial relation settings.”
(ILO 1997:97) Claus Offe (1981) referred several times to what can be considered as the ‘class
bias’ of these industrial relation settings. The point is that organisations of labour and capital,
although affected by exactly the same forms of institutionalisation, are inhibited to a greatly
differing extent in their freedom to pursue their respective interests. Put simply and abbreviating a
long and complicated discussion, unions need strong, encompassing peak organisations
negotiating mainly on and out of the most centralised and collective bargaining level.
“Paradoxically, the political power of investors depends to some extent on the condition of
powerlessness of their interest organization, which have, neither de lege nor de facto, more than
marginal control over members’ investment decisions. What the goverments can do, then, in order
to secure the willingness of investors to cooperate, is to design policies that are most conducive to
profits - which remain the only channel by which investors are to be controlled - and win the
support of organized labor for such policies.” (Offe 1981:150) In other words, the relative shift of
the main point of collective bargaining towards the level of the individual enterprise, in the light of
the improvement and development of flexibility - of which the humanisation of capital is another
element - strengthens the position of the management in relation to that of labour. The dualisation,
segmentation or fragmentation of the work force, evolutions that can go together with the new
‘human capital’ approach, weakens the traditional collective trade union organisations. This is
where the power dimension of ‘human capital’ shows itself in all its clearness.
In sum, flexibilisation, outsourcement or other adjustments of the organisation structure,
decentralisation of collective bargaining, the construction of new communication channels, the
individualisation of reward systems, the proliferation of employment contracts, etc. fit close with
the ‘human capital’ approach, using the broad spectrum of IT. This approach tries to flexibilise the
work force, push up their commitment, concern, involvement, participation and engagement,
utilise all their potentials, model the employment contracts and tasks on the particularities
(strength, knowledge, skills, etc.) of the individual worker, etc.. In this pursuit, a first difference
between core workers and non-core workers becomes visible. Secondly, the entire workforce
becomes the subject of de-massification, of class dealignment and decomposition. As we have
noticed, this has important strategic consequences for the power resources of trade unions and
thus for the process of collective bargaining.
5.2 Changed political responsibilities: the importance of the regional authorities.19
Another essential political consequence of the revaluation of labour as ‘human capital’ in a
post-fordist flexible accumulation regime concerns the transformation of state responsibilities or,
more precisely, the shift of emphasis within the governmental policy.
Nowadays, it is quite popular to say that the state is ‘withering away’: the Keynesian
Welfare State (KWS) is disintegrating and is being replaced by a form of ‘competition state’, e.g.
the Schumpeterian Workfare State (SWS). This SWS is a different kind of state than the KWS.
The SWS is, in some way, ‘smaller’ than the KWS but does not in any sense indicates the end of
the state responsibilities, competences or capacities: “In abstract terms, its distinctive objectives in
economic and social reproduction are: to promote product, process, organisational, and market
innovation in open economies in order to strenghthen as far as possible the structural
competitiveness of the national economy by intervening on the supply-side; and to subordinate
social policy to the needs of labour market flexibility and/or the constraints of international
competition. In this sense it marks a clear break with the KWS as domestic full employment is de-
prioritised in favour of international competitiveness and redistributive welfare rights take second
place to a productivist re-ordening of social policy.” (Jessop 1994:24)
The Schumpeterian element refers to the idea that political authorities should concentrate
less on demand-side measures, such as full employment or a redistribution policy, should less try
to preserve old industries but instead focus on the encouragement of promising activities, on the
construction and management of a favourable investment climate (supporting ‘creative
destruction’). In other words, political authorities should focus more on a supply-side policy (e.g.
education, R&D, infrastructure, re-skilling processes, etc.) stimulating the international
attractiveness of the local production factors. Workfare - namely the activation and thus
heightened selectivity of social benefits - refers to the greater responsibility of the individual, both
for its own succes or failure (e.g. policies encouraging, in several ways, the unemployed to make
great efforts and to take initiatives in order to improve their chances on the labour market). So, the
post-fordist SWS stands for an important change of state responsibilities and for a different
method of operation in order to achieve these aims.
Elsewhere, we alleged that competition in Europe is mainly European, rather than a violent
struggle against NIC’s, Japan or the USA (Devos 1999). Indeed, research has indicated that the
EU is a very regionalized macro-region, with a high degree of internal interdependence and
interaction, so the ‘internal’ not the global market is the first battlefield. In the EU, political-20
institutional (d)evolutions have, in several European countries, shifted important socio-economic
competences upwards and downwards, away from the nation-state level. In the European market,
the political option has been to transfer competences towards the macro-regional EU-level and
towards the micro-regional level. Both are chapters of the same story.
The competences entrusted to the EU are ‘high economics’, by analogy with ‘high politics’:
the construction of a common macro-economic framework, shaping the European market, a
common budgetary and financial policy, coordination of national policies in the field of
employment policies, some very general social regulations, etc. However, the general and
superficial competences of the EU in the field of labour market regulation are for the time being
without a truly decisive influence on the course of economic activity and on the decisions
concerning the location of production. Due to national differences and incompatibilities, the social
regulation of the European labour market is still mainly established at the level of the member
states. The construction of an European welfare state is rather unlikely. In the opinion of Martin
Rhodes “it is clear that nothing resembling a European ‘welfare state’ currently exists and few
social risks are dealt with at the European level (...) The political structures of the EU prevent the
transfer of major welfare/distributive resources to the European level” (Rhodes 1998:105; on the
persistence of differences between national systems in Europe, see Lecher & Platzer 1998).
As a result of regional, nationalistic or federalistic tendencies and devolution processes
within some EU-members, certain parts of the competences to regulate the labour market and of
the so-called ‘flanking’ policies have been assigned to the regional authorities. In other EU-
members the process of regionalisation has not (yet) resulted in a meaningful transfer of
competences enabling the regional state-level to influence seriously the supply and quality of the
regional production factors (more specifically human capital) on the global, that is mainly
European, market. In several of them, however, apparently soft competences, such as education,
training programs, activation policies, infrastructure, environement, etc. are placed in charge of the
region. ‘Apparently’ soft refers to the fact that these ‘soft’ issues increasingly become ‘hard’
determinative issues in the era of the knowledge economy since they can be of great significance
for the quality and capacities of the local human capital factor.
This means that the majority of the competences of the different European regional
authorities are increasingly relevant for the attractiveness of the region as a site of economic
activity on the global market of possible sites. In other words, the knowledge economy increases
the importance of regional authorities for the wealth of that region since these authorities have in
many cases a considerable influence on the quality of the one immobile production factor that is21
tied to the region, namely human capital. Since the significance of human capital has increased
substantially, in view of the the shift towards a post-fordist ‘knowledge’ accumulation regime,
these regional competences are of increasing importance. Whatever the nature of the competences
allocated to the region, it seems to be a recurring reflex that they increasingly become
economically relevant, or at least that the economic (more specifically, cost-competitive)
consequences of each decision taken in the field of a specific competence are taken into account.
A very deciding reflection is whether a certain decision deteriorates or improves the competitive
position of those living in a region and since all regions or states are captured by this logic, there
seems to be no other way.
The general argument is that increased globalisation has actually influenced and
circumscribed the extent of the autonomy that previously existed at the national and sub-national
level. This does not mean that it has ended it. Regional and national governments continue to
retain considerable leverage over the economy and their responsibilities towards the value of the
local human capital are unmistakable. In spite of the fact that the national and regional state is still
political significant and retains much of its formal sovereignty, its capacities to project its formal
power are weakened but not vanished. The common perception seems to be that these remains of
glorious times must be brought into action in order to please the increasingly mobile (actual and
potential) investors and that the tendency towards a SWS - or any other version of the competition
state - is inevitable since other states and regions are exhausting themselves to do the same, trying
to snatch away existing and new investments (see the popularity of concepts such as ‘regime
shopping’ or ‘competitive deregulation’).
This strategical switch towards a version of the SWS emphasizes the importance of
policies concerning the human capital. Since regions are increasingly entitled to regulate aspects
(such as education) that are of huge importance for the immobile production factor ‘human
capital’, regional authorities have - even in a post-fordist accumulation regime - an important, beit
a changed, rol to play in the maintenance and improvement of the attractiveness of their
inhabitants in the global market of production sites.
6. Conclusion.
As the ILO indicated, “the internationalization of the economy, whether as present fact or
future potential, has a clear impact on industrial relations. It certainly seems to contribute,
however indirectly, to the weakening of the trade union movement in several countries. The22
greater possibilities for transferring activities from one region to another, or from one country to
another, enhance employers’ arguments at the bargaining table, even if such arguments are
stronger than actual transfers are frequent (which is most often the case). This globalization
process combines with other factors, foremost among which are the new production and
communication technologies, which are crucial in the changes taking place in the economic and
social landscape.”(ILO 1997:221) Some of these other factors, especially with regard to the new
production organisation, are described in the above discussion.
The general conclusion of this paper, which is meant to instigate further debate, is that the
transformation of workers to ‘human capital’ has important consequences for the balance of
power between trade unions and the management and for the state, in particular regional state,
responsibilities. Out of a political science framework we attempted to illuminate some aspects of
these politically important evolutions. We hope to have demonstrated that these apparently neutral
and purely on efficiency based recommendations have indeed important political consequences that
need to be mentioned.23
References.
Baran, P., Sweezy, P., 1966, Monopoly capital. New York, Monthly Review.
Blair, T., 1998, The Third Way. New politics for the new century. Fabian Pamphlet 588. London,
The Fabian Society.
Boyer, R., 1990, The regulation school. A critical introduction. New York, Columbia University
Press.
Brand, H., 1997, Global capitalism and the decay of employment policy. In: Dissent, fall 1997.
Braverman, H., 1974, Labor and monopoly capital. New York, Monthly Review Press.
Brewster, C., Mayne, L., Tregakis, O., 1997, Flexible working in Europe. In: Journal of World
Business, 32, 2, 133-151.
Cox, R., 1987, Production, power and world order. Social forces in the making of history. New
York, Columbia University Press.
D’Aveni, R.A., 1997, Waking up to the new era of hypercompetition. In: The Washington
Quarterly, 21, 1, 183-193.
Devos, C., (1999), The myth of globalisation and its strategic consequences. In: Democritos,
1999, 1.
Fairris, D., 1994, Shopfloor relations in the postwar capital-labor accord. In: Kotz, D.,
McDonough, T., Reich, M., (eds.), Social structures of accumulation. The political economy of
growth and crisis. Cambridge, Cambridge University Press.
Frantzen, D.J., 1990, Growth and crisis in post-war capitalism. Aldershot, Dartmouth.24
Fröbel, F., Heinrichs, J., Kreye, O., 1981, The new international division of labour : structural
unemployment in industrialised countries and industrialisation in developing countries.
Cambridge, Cambridge University Press
Froud, J., Haslam, C., Johal, S., Leaver, A., Williams, J., Williams, K., 1999, The Third Way and
the jammed economy. In: Capital and Class, 67, 155-166.
Giddens, A., 1998, The Third Way. The renewal of social democracy. Cambridge, Polity Press.
Harvey, D., 1989, The condition of postmodernity. An enquiry into the origins of cultural change.
Oxford, Basil Blackwell.
International Labour Office, 1997, Industrial relations, democracy and social stability. World
labour report 1997-98. Geneva, International Labour Office.
Jessop, B., 1994, The transition to post-Fordism and the Schumpeterian workfare state. In:
Loader, B., Burrows, R., (eds.), Towards a post-Fordist welfare state? London, Routlegde.
Kenney, M., 1997, Value creation in the late twentieth century. The rise of the knowledge worker.
In: Davis, J., Hirschl, T., Stack, M., (eds.), Cutting edge. Technology, information, capitalism and
social revolution. London, Verso.
Kim, W.C., Mauborgne, R., 1999. Strategy, value innovation and the knowledge economy. In:
Sloan Management Review, spring.
Lash, S., Urry, J., 1987, The end of organized capitalism. Cambridge, Polity Press.
Lecher, W.E., Platzer, H-W., (eds.), 1998, European Union - European industrial relations?
Global challenges, national developments and transnational dynamics. London, Routledge.
Maddison, A., 1991, Dynamic forces in capitalist development. A long-run comparative view.
Oxford, Oxford University Press.25
McClintock, B., 1996, International trade and the governance of global markets. In: Whalen, C.J.,
(ed.), Political economy for the 21st century. Contemporary views on the trend of economics.
New York, M.E. Sharpe.
Moody, K., 1997, Workers in a lean world. Unions in the international economy. London, Verso.
Offe, C., 1981, The attribution of public status to interest groups: observations on the West
German case. In: Berger, S., (ed.), Organizing interests in Western Europe. Pluralism,
corporatism, and the transformation of politics. Cambridge, Cambridge University Press.
Palan, R., Abbott, J., Deans, P., 1996, State strategies in the global political economy. London,
Pinter.
Pierson, C., 1994, Continuity and discontinuity in the emergence of the post-Fordist welfare state.
In: Loader, B., Burrows, R., (eds.), Towards a post-Fordist welfare state? London, Routlegde.
Polanyi, K., 1944, The great transformation. New York, Rinehart & Company Inc.
Rodrik, D., 1997, Has globalization gone too far? Washington, DC, Institute for International
Economics.
Ross, R.J.S., Trachte, K.C., 1990, Global capitalism. The new Leviathan. Albany, State University
of New York Press.
Rhodes, M., 1998, Subversive liberalism. Market integration, globalization and West European
welfare states. In: Coleman, W.D., Underhill, G.R.D., Regionalism and global economic
integration. Europe, Asia and the Americas. London, Routledge.
Ruggie, J.G., (1983), International regimes, transactions and change: Embedded liberalism in the
postwar economic order. In: Krasner, S., (ed.), International regimes. Ithaca, Cornell University
Press, pp.159-232.
Schor, J.B., You, J.-I., 1995, Introduction: after the golden age. In: Schor, J.B., You, J.-I., (eds.),
Capital, the state and labour. Aldershot, Edward Elgar.26
Streeck, W., 1984, Neo-corporatist industrial relations and the economic crisis in West Germany.
In: Goldthorpe, J.H., (ed.), Order and conflict in contemporary capitalism. Oxford, Clarendon
Press.
Streeck, W., 1992, Social institutions and economic performance: Studies of industrial relations in
advanced capitalist economies. London, Sage.
The Economist, 1996, The year the downsizing grew up. 21 dec.
Thomas, K.P., 1997, Capital beyond borders. States and firms in the auto industry 1960-94.
London, Macmillan.
Thurow, L.C., 1999, Building wealth. The new rules for individuals, companies, and nations. In:
The Atlantic Monthly, 283, 6, june.
Triplett, J.E., 1999, Economic statistics, the new economy, and the productivity slowdown. In:
Business Economics, april.
Veseth, M., 1998, Selling globalization. The myth of the global economy. Lynne Rienner
Publishers, Colorado.
Womack, J.P., Jones, D.T., Roos, D., 1990, The machine that changed the world. New York,
Rawson.